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Abstract
Using a matched employer-employee panel dataset for Germany, we analyze the 
external eﬀ  ects of education on individual wages. Following the basic framework of 
Moretti (2004), we allow spillover eﬀ  ects to occur both within a speciﬁ  c ﬁ  rm and a 
speciﬁ  c region rather than analyzing spillover eﬀ  ects only on a regional level. Con-
trolling for individual- and ﬁ  rm-speciﬁ  c ﬁ  xed eﬀ  ects and using an instrumental vari-
able strategy, our results conﬁ  rm the existence of positive but small external eﬀ  ects 
of human capital. Positive spillover eﬀ  ects within ﬁ  rms occur only for the group of 
high-skilled workers.
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The Lisbon Agenda of the European Council aims at making the European Union
the world’s most dynamic and competitive economy by transforming the EU into
a large knowledge-based economy. To achieve this goal, the member states agreed
to modernize their education systems in order to cope with the necessities of a
knowledge-based society. Concerning education, the Lisbon Agenda explicitly asks
their member states to increase their investments in human capital substantially.
The main idea behind this strategy is that human capital investments have pos-
itive externalities that foster economic growth. In Germany, for example, public
spending for the educational system in 2004 reached almost 86 Million Euro or
about 4% of GDP (RWI Essen and Stifterverband f¨ ur die deutsche Wissenschaft,
2006).
While there exist a vast literature on the private returns of human capital
(Card, 1999, 2001), the empirical evidence on the external eﬀects of human cap-
ital is rather limited. Closely following the identiﬁcation strategy of (Moretti,
2004a,c), we estimate augmented Mincer-type wage equations (Mincer, 1974) us-
ing a matched employer-employee data set for Germany. Diﬀerent to the existing
literature, however, we analyze both, external eﬀects occurring at the ﬁrm- and
the regional level, providing insights on whether positive external eﬀects at the
regional level are only the sum of ﬁrm-level spillover-eﬀects, or whether regional
spillover-eﬀects exist over and above ﬁrm-level eﬀects. In addition – to the best of
our knowledge – this paper is the ﬁrst to analyze the existence of human capital
externalities using individual data for Germany.
Taking time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity into account by controlling for
individual and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects and instrumenting the regional share of high-skilled
workers by historical regional shares of workers with an university degree, we could
conﬁrm the existence of positive external eﬀects of human capital for high-skilled
workers. Even though we also ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of the share of high-skilled
in a region on the wages of low-skilled, this evidence is not a clear indication of
positive externalities of human capital, since we are not able to separately identify
4positive spillover eﬀects of human capital and wage eﬀects of a change in labor
supply for this group of workers. Signiﬁcant positive intra-ﬁrm spillover eﬀects of
human capital appear only for the group of high-skilled workers.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the literature on
external eﬀects of education. Section 3 describes the econometric model and the
data used for estimation. Section 4 presents the estimation results and Section 5
concludes.
2 External Eﬀects of Education: Theory and Ex-
isting Evidence
Positive externalities have always been the major justiﬁcation for governments to
subsidize the educational system. This justiﬁcation is mainly based on theoreti-
cal models, who suggest several diﬀerent sources of human capital externalities.
Recent contributions to growth theory, for example, emphasize human capital ac-
cumulation as a major determinant of economic growth, wherein the mechanism
through which this eﬀect occurs is modeled in diﬀerent ways. The majority of mod-
els emphasize the interaction of workers with diﬀerent skill levels, i.e. they assume
that higher skilled individuals increase the productivity of others with whom they
work together. Thus, human capital accumulation increases total factor produc-
tivity and hence results in economic growth towards a higher equilibrium output
(Lucas, 1988). Endogenous growth theory claims that a higher level of educa-
tion in an economy increases its innovative power and knowledge diﬀusion. The
new technologies, products and production processes resulting from this innovative
power and a better diﬀusion of knowledge in turn foster economic growth (Romer,
1990; Temple, 2001; Shapiro, 2006).
Another strand of the literature points towards possible non-monetary bene-
ﬁts of human capital, i.e. positive external eﬀects that are not directly linked to
higher productivity. This type of external beneﬁts may, for example, arise from
a negative relationship between education and criminal behavior, which is usu-
5ally conﬁrmed by empirical studies on the determinants of crime (Lochner and
Moretti, 2004). Higher education may further increase the stability of a democ-
racy and the eﬃciency of economic policy, because higher skilled individuals are
more competent to participate in the political process (Friedman, 1962; Milligan,
Moretti, and Oreopoulos, 2003). Finally, education may have direct consumption
externalities, raising welfare without having any impact on productivity (Lange
and Topel, 2006).
Signalling or screening models of education, however, claim that education may
also be associated with negative externalities (Arrow, 1973; Spence, 1973). In its
extreme version, the screening model suggests that education does not enhance
the productivity of an individual at all. Rather it is solely used as a signal of the
latent productivity of an individual for which employers are willing to pay. In this
type of models, education only generates private returns. Since schooling does not
increase the productivity of individuals, it reduces social welfare because of the
resources used to obtain the signal, i.e. a schooling degree. Hence, to the extent
that schooling is used as a signal rather than increasing productivity, education
may be even associated with negative externalities.
The empirical evidence on the existence and size of external eﬀects of educa-
tion is rather scarce, especially when compared to the extensive literature on the
private returns to education (Card, 1999, 2001, provides an overview of this liter-
ature). Existing evidence is further predominantly based on US data. Following
Moretti (2004b), three major empirical strategies to evaluate the external eﬀects of
human capital can be diﬀerentiated: (i) studies of the eﬀects of aggregate human
capital in a city or a region on individual wages or land prices; (ii) studies that
evaluate the eﬀects of aggregated human capital indicators on productivity either
using ﬁrm or regional data; and (iii) studies that evaluate the eﬀect of education
on other social outcomes such as crime rates or voting behavior.
Rauch (1993) uses cross-sectional regional data for the U.S. in 1980. He ﬁnds
small, but signiﬁcantly positive eﬀects on wages, which can be seen as an upper
6boundary, as he does not take the endogeneity of location choices into account.
Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) ﬁnd signiﬁcant positive eﬀects of state level shares of
college graduates on individual wages in the U.S. for the period from 1960 to 1980.
This eﬀect becomes insigniﬁcant once they implement an IV estimation strategy
with changes in compulsory schooling laws as an instrument for the regional share
of high-skilled. Adding data from 1990, however, the eﬀect becomes signiﬁcant
even in the IV framework, indicating a rising importance of human capital.
Moretti (2004b,a) develops a theoretical model to capture external eﬀects of
education in land prices and wages. Employing individual data for the US and
instrumenting the regional share of high-skilled by the existence of land-grant col-
leges in a region. to take the endogenous location choice into account, he ﬁnds a
wage premium of 0.4% for college-educated workers, if the share of high-educated
workers is increased by one-percentage point. For low-skilled workers, the point
estimate is sizeably higher (1.6-1.9%), but imperfect substitution between the skill-
groups1 prevents the precise estimation of the magnitude of the spillover eﬀect
(Moretti, 2004b). In some speciﬁcations a regional spillover eﬀect of up to 9% in
certain regions is found (Moretti, 2004a). Using plant-level productivity data, he
ﬁnds a spillover eﬀect on productivity in the range of 0.5-0.7% for a one-percentage
point increase in the college share by comparing ﬁrms in high- and low-skilled cities
(Moretti, 2004c).
Ciccone and Peri (2006) also use aggregated data on the regional level, as they
criticize the individual approach as being not feasible to identify externalities due
to the non-inclusion of downward sloping aggregate demand for human capital.
Using a decomposition approach to control for changes in the skill structure of the
workforce, they cannot conﬁrm the existence of positive externalities for US cities
between 1970 and 1990.
Outside the US, there exists evidence on human capital externalities for Swe-
den, Italy, Spain, China, and Russia. Isacsson (2005) supports the existence of
1Katz and Murphy (1992) provide evidence for imperfect substition in the US labor market.
7signiﬁcant positive external eﬀects of education when applying cross-sectional
models to Swedish matched employer-employee establishment data. These ef-
fects disappear when he controls for regional and individual ﬁxed eﬀects. Several
studies conﬁrm signiﬁcant positive human capital externalities in Italy, both using
individual-level data (Dalmazzo and de Blasio, 2007a,b) and ﬁrm-level data (Bratti
and Leombruni, 2009). The same holds for Spain, where Ciccone, Garcia-Fontes,
and Hidalgo (2008) also ﬁnd positive educational spillover eﬀects using diﬀerent
identiﬁcation strategies. Liu (2008) ﬁnds wage increases in the magnitude of 6.3%
for a one-percentage point increase in the regional college share in China using
an IV estimation strategy with historic values of education levels as instruments.
The results, however, are only signiﬁcant at a 10-15% signiﬁcance level. Based
on individual data, Muravyev (2008) conﬁrms positive regional spillover eﬀects
for Russia, using the transition process and the following movement of qualiﬁed
individuals into cities as a natural experiment. He ﬁnds spillover eﬀects on wages
in cities in the magnitude of 1-2%.
In summary, the existing evidence for human capital externalities predomi-
nantly relies on estimates of the eﬀects of aggregate human capital in regions on
individual wages and on US data. The results indicates that these externalities are
indeed positive and in most cases statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that potential
negative externalities due to signalling are at least not dominating. The existing
evidence, however, provides no clear indication on the size of these positive exter-
nalities.
3 Econometric Model and Data
To evaluate the external eﬀects of education, we closely follow Moretti (2004b) by
estimating augmented Mincer-type wage regressions of the following form:
lnwijt = Xijtβ + Zjtδ + γ0Art + γ1Ajt + ξTt + εijt, (1)
where Xijt is a vector of observable socioeconomic characteristics of person i in
8ﬁrm j at time t, Zjt a vector of ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics at time t, and Tt a
vector of year dummies to control for year speciﬁc eﬀects. The residual εijt is
assumed to have the usual properties. The two main variables of interest are Art
and Ajt. The former is an indicator of aggregated human capital in a region,
calculated as the share of high-skilled individuals working in region r at time t.
Correspondingly, Ajt is an indicator of the aggregated human capital in a ﬁrm,
calculated as the share of high-skilled workers employed in ﬁrm j at time t. The
estimated coeﬃcients of these two variables, γ0 and γ1, provide evidence of the
existence of regional and ﬁrm-level spillover eﬀects of education, respectively.
Estimating equation (1) by OLS may lead to biased estimates of γ0 and γ1
because of unobserved variables that are correlated with individual wages and
the share of high-skilled individuals in a region or ﬁrm. Regions and ﬁrms, for
example, that demand a high-skilled workforce may also oﬀer higher returns to
unobserved abilities, leading to upward biased estimates of γ0 and γ1. The panel
structure of our data, however, allows us to control for time-invariant unobserved
individual and ﬁrm eﬀects that may be correlated with Art and Ajt. Therefore,
we subsequently added individual (αi) and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects (αj) to equation (1).
As it is not necessary for us to estimate the magnitude of the individual- and
ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects itself to identify spillover eﬀects, we follow Abowd, Kramarz,
and Margolis (1999) when controlling for both individual and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects by
using spell-ﬁxed eﬀects to transform the regression function into:
lnwijt = Xijtβ + Zjtδ + γ0Art + γ1Ajt + ξTt + αi · αj + εijt. (2)
In our estimations we further use robust standard errors, clustered at the ﬁrm
level, controlling for heteroskedasticity and possible serial correlation within ﬁrms.
The above regression models are estimated separately for three groups of work-
ers: low-skilled, medium-skilled and high-skilled workers. If high- and low-skilled
workers are imperfect substitutes, two diﬀerent mechanisms are at work if the pro-
portion of both types of workers is changing (Moretti, 2004b). The relative supply
of low-skilled workers is declining if more high-educated workers enter the work-
force. In this case, regional and ﬁrm-speciﬁc educational spillover eﬀects, i.e. the
9signs of γ0 and γ1, are expected to be positive for low-skilled workers, (i) because
of their increasing relative scarcity and (ii) because of productivity and learning
eﬀects (the actual spillover eﬀect itself). Hence, for low-skilled workers a γ0 > 0
and a γ1 > 0 is not necessarily evidence for positive human capital externalities,
since they may simply reﬂect a higher relative scarcity of low-skilled workers in
the respective labor market. A diﬀerent situation arises, if both kinds of workers
are perfect substitutes. In that case, the sign of the coeﬃcient is not clear a priori.2
For high-skilled workers, however, a γ0 > 0 and a γ1 > 0 could be interpreted
as evidence for positive human capital externalities, since they are inﬂuenced by
two contradictory eﬀects. On the one hand, they will have the same or even higher
learning eﬀects compared to low-skilled workers. On the other hand, the relative
shift in the workforce is directed against them, as the supply of more educated
workers is likely to lower the wages oﬀered to them following standard supply and
demand analysis. Hence, positive estimates of the two coeﬃcients of interest in-
dicate that the spillover eﬀects of human capital for high-skilled workers are big
enough to compensate for potential negative wage eﬀects due to an increased sup-
ply of high-skilled workers.
Overall, one can expect that the coeﬃcients γ0 and γ1 for low-skilled workers
exceed the respective coeﬃcients for high-skilled workers, because in the situation
of imperfect substitution the former beneﬁt both from an increased share of high-
skilled workers and additionally from potential human capital externalities, while
the spillover eﬀects of human capital for high-skilled workers must be big enough
to compensate for potential negative wage eﬀects due to an increased supply of
high-skilled workers.
Further problems arise, because the human capital share in a region Art is likely
to be endogenous, as workers may move between regions to live in areas with a
higher or lower share of educated people and corresponding amenities (Moretti,
2Bauer, Kluve, Schaﬀner, and Schmidt (2009) provide recent evidence for Germany that
workers of diﬀerent skill-levels are imperfect substitutes.
102004b). To deal with this endogeneity problem, we instrument the respective co-
variates using the regional share of workers with an university degree 20 years
before (1975-1981) our observation period, as 1975 is the ﬁrst year where such
process-generated data from the federal employment agency becomes available to
us. This instrument should be orthogonal to current individual wages while still
giving us exogenous variation in the share of high-skilled individuals in a region.
To perform our estimations, we use the LIAB, a linked employer-employee
dataset that is provided by the Institut f¨ ur Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung
(IAB) in Nuremberg and maintained and accessible through the associated research
data center (FDZ). The LIAB is created by matching oﬃcial, process-generated
data from the social security system (i.e. the German Federal Employment Ser-
vices) to data from the IAB Establishment Panel.3 We use the LIAB Version 2
to be able to follow persons over time and track ﬁrm changers, which is crucial
to our identiﬁcation strategy. From the LIAB, we create an unbalanced panel for
the years 1996 to 2001 including ﬁrms and workers in West-Germany. The sam-
ple of workers is restricted to full-time employed persons in regular employment.
Apprentices and part-time workers are excluded from the analysis.
One major drawback of using the LIAB is the quality of the information on
the highest education level achieved by an individual. This information may be
poorly measured as it is ﬁlled by the employer and not linked to any payments
to or beneﬁts from the social security system. Furthermore, the number of ob-
viously wrongly measured, inconsistent and missing observations increases over
time (Fitzenberger, Osikominu, and V¨ olter, 2006). To solve this problem, the
distinction between qualiﬁcation groups in our analysis is accomplished using a
classiﬁcation scheme proposed by Blossfeld (1985). This scheme is based on the
three-digit occupational deﬁnition of an individual as it was speciﬁed by the em-
ployer in their notiﬁcation to the social security agencies. We diﬀerentiate three
qualiﬁcation groups: (i) low-skilled workers (low), (ii) medium-skilled workers
(medium) and (iii) high-skilled workers (high). Following Blossfeld (1985), all
3For further information about the LIAB see Alda, Bender, and Gartner (2005).
11blue-collar workers who work in a position that is characterized by simple manual
tasks and white-collar workers performing simple services are considered to belong
to the low-skilled group. Blue-collar workers performing complicated tasks and
white-collar workers associated with qualiﬁed tasks, as well as semi-professionals
are considered to be medium-skilled workers. The group of high-skilled work-
ers consists of engineers, technicians, professionals and managers. The resulting
classiﬁcation is highly correlated with the completed occupational education of in-
dividual.4 Based on this grouping, we observe 91,965 low-skilled workers, resulting
in 349,666 person-year observations, 130,188 individuals with medium qualiﬁca-
tion (521,288 person-year observations) and 89,129 high-skilled workers (360,021
person-year observations), working in 2,042 ﬁrms which are spread over 66 regions,
with the latter being deﬁned as the districts of the responsible local unemployment
oﬃce (“Arbeitsamtsbezirke”).
Throughout, we control for ﬁrm size, the state of the production technology
used by the ﬁrm by deﬁning a dummy-variable that takes the value one for ﬁrms
that use technology that is above the mean state of technology in the industry, a
dummy variable measuring whether organizational changes occurred in a ﬁrm in
the previous year, the mean-age of the workforce in a ﬁrm, and a dummy vari-
able, indicating whether the ﬁrm is covered by centralized wage bargaining. When
estimating equation (1) by pooled OLS, we also control for time-invariant individ-
ual characteristics, i.e. gender, age, and age-squared. The share of highly-skilled
workers in the ﬁrm and the region, i.e. Ajt and Art, are calculated for each person
separately, without its own contribution to the mean. Table 1 provides summary
statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis.
4 Estimation Results
Results from estimating equation (1) by pooled OLS are reported in Table 2.
When including only the share of high-skilled workers in the region in the speci-
4For further information about this classiﬁcation scheme see Bauer and Bender (2004).
12ﬁcation (column 1), the point estimates of γ0 appear to be positive for all three
skill groups. As expected, ˆ γ0 is highest for the low-skilled group and lowest for
high-skilled workers. However, only the estimated coeﬃcient for the high-skilled
workers appears to be statistical signiﬁcant on conventional levels. Controlling
only for the share of high-skilled workers in the ﬁrm (column 2), we obtain posi-
tive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for this variable for the low- and high-skilled, with
the latter being statistically signiﬁcant at the 10%-level, whereas the respective
coeﬃcient for medium-skilled workers is negative, albeit insigniﬁcant. The results
do not change signiﬁcantly when considering both aggregated human capital mea-
sures jointly (column 3).
These results provide evidence for the existence of positive human capital ex-
ternalities for high-skilled workers. For this group of workers the spillover eﬀects
of human capital appears to be big enough to compensate for potential wage losses
due to a higher supply of workers in the same skill group. Furthermore, the results
indicate that human capital externalities exist on the regional level over and above
positive educational spillovers on the ﬁrm-level.
The estimates obtained by pooled OLS may be biased by unobserved time-
invariant individual and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects that are correlated with the share of
high-skilled in the region and the ﬁrm. Therefore, columns (1) to (3) of Table 3
reports estimation results when controlling for individual ﬁxed eﬀects, and columns
(4) to (6) when controlling for both, individual and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. The estima-
tion results indicate that pooled OLS delivers upward-biased eﬀects of the regional
share of high-skilled workers on individual wages, while the estimated eﬀects of
the share of high-skilled workers in a ﬁrm appears not to be biased by unobserved
time-invariant eﬀects. Furthermore, the biased estimates of pooled OLS seem to
be driven by time-invariant individual ﬁxed eﬀects, since the estimation results do
not change signiﬁcantly when controlling for both individual and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects
if compared to those we obtain, when controlling only for individual ﬁxed eﬀects.
When controlling for unobserved individual and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect, the estimated
13eﬀect of the regional share of high-skilled workers on wages becomes statistically
signiﬁcant for the low-skilled, while the signiﬁcant positive eﬀect obtained in pooled
OLS for high-skilled workers becomes insigniﬁcant. Evaluated at the respective
means of the share of high-skilled in a region (see Table 1), the estimated coef-
ﬁcients imply that the wage of low-skilled rise by about 0.6% when the share of
high-skilled in a region increases by one percentage point. As noted, this eﬀect
subsumes both, educational spillovers and the eﬀects of a imperfect substitution
between high- and low-skilled workers, and, hence, does not provide clear evidence
on the existence of positive human capital externalities. However, the results still
provide evidence on the existence of positive spillover eﬀects for high-skilled within
ﬁrms. The estimated coeﬃcient for γ1 reported in column (6) of Table (3) indi-
cates that an increase of the share of high-skilled in a ﬁrm of one percentage point
increases the wages of high-skilled in this ﬁrm by 2.8%.
As discussed in the last section, the estimates reported in Table (3) might
still be biased due to the endogenous location choice of individuals. To address
this problem, we instrumented the regional share of high-skilled workers with the
historical regional share of workers with an university degree. Table 4 reports the
results of the IV estimates5, with columns (1) and (2) referring to the results of a
pooled OLS-IV model, and the remaining columns to the results of a ﬁxed eﬀects-
IV model, where we included only individual ﬁxed eﬀects in columns (3) and (4),
and individual and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects in columns (5) and (6). Compared to the
results of the simple pooled OLS model shown in Table (2), the estimated eﬀect of
the share of high-skilled in a region on high-skilled is halved but still statistically
signiﬁcant at the 10%-level. The ﬁxed-eﬀects IV estimates, however, are similar
to those reported in Table (3), despite that the coeﬃcient on the regional share
of high-skilled becomes statistically signiﬁcant at the 10%-level for high-skilled
5All IV regressions were performed using the ivreg2-command from Baum, Schaﬀer, and
Stillman (2010). Note that the standard errors of the IV estimates are slightly lower if compared
to the OLS estimates. This unexpected result can entirely be traced back to the clustering of the
standard errors at the ﬁrm level. When we do not adjust the standard errors for potential serial
correlation at the ﬁrm level the IV standard errors are bigger than the respective OLS standard
errors.
14workers. Evaluated at the respective means of the regional share of high-skilled
workers, the estimated coeﬃcient implies, that an increase of the share of high-
skilled in a region by one percentage point increase the wage of high-skilled workers
by 0.2% and those of low-skilled workers by 0.6%. Note that these eﬀects are at
the lower end of those found by Moretti (2004b,a) for the US.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates the existence of external eﬀects of human capital using an
employer-employee matched panel data set for Germany. Diﬀerent to the existent
literature on this issue, we are able to analyze both the eﬀects of the regional
share of high-skilled workers and the share of high-skilled workers in a ﬁrm on
individual wages, allowing us to study whether regional spillover eﬀects of human
capital exist over and above ﬁrm-speciﬁc spillover eﬀects.
We estimate Mincer-type wage equations, controlling for individual and ﬁrm
level unobserved heterogeneity by using ﬁxed eﬀects as well as instrumenting the
share of qualiﬁed workers in a region using historical share of workers with an
university-degree. The results suggest that high-skilled workers experience posi-
tive regional and intra-ﬁrm spillover eﬀects of education. We also ﬁnd a positive
eﬀect of the regional share of high-skilled workers on the wages of low-skilled. This
latter eﬀect, however, is no clear indication of positive external eﬀects of human
capital, because an increase in the share of high-skilled reduces the relative supply
of low-skilled, which in turn may have positive eﬀects on their wages. The esti-
mated spillover eﬀects are, however, very small, indicating that an increase of the
share of high-skilled in a region by one percentage point increase the wage of high-
skilled workers by 0.2% and those of low-skilled workers by 0.6%. The estimates
further indicate, that statistically signiﬁcant intra-ﬁrm spillover eﬀecs eﬀects exist
only for high-skilled workers. For them, a one percentage point increase of the
share of high-skilled in the ﬁrm increases the wages by about 3%.
Even though our results conﬁrm the existence of external eﬀects of human cap-
15ital, the size of this eﬀect appears to be rather negligible, casting some doubts
on the reasoning, that higher education should be subsidized because of the ex-
istence of positive external eﬀects. Furthermore, the distribution of the positive
spillover eﬀects among the workforce appears not to be uniform. On top of receiv-
ing private returns to education, mostly high-skilled workers beneﬁt from working
together with high-skilled co-workers.
16Table 1: Summary Statistics
Low Medium High
Mean Std. Dev.
Daily Wage (EUR) 57.72 19.74 68.58 23.19 83.28 25.51
Age 38.16 11.08 38.28 11.09 39.69 11.01
Gender 0.685 0.464 0.445 0.497 0.412 0.492
Mean Age of Workforce 38.29 4.42 38.31 4.84 38.34 4.17
Firm Size 3243.41 4123.33 4212.91 4657.83 4174.75 4492.32
Technical Change 0.498 0.500 0.452 0.498 0.432 0.495
Organizational Change 0.276 0.447 0.301 0.459 0.304 0.460
General Wage Contract 0.843 0.367 0.884 0.320 0.895 0.306
Regional Share of HQ 0.047 0.017 0.048 0.020 0.051 0.022
Firm Share of HQ 0.035 0.037 0.040 0.040 0.093 0.054
Regional Share of HQ (overall) 0.0542 0.0520
Firm Share of HQ (overall) 0.0483 0.0209
17Table 2: Estimation Results for OLS and Fixed Eﬀects
(1) (2) (3)
Low Region 0.724 - 0.705
(0.532) (0.531)
Firm - 0.122 0.084
(0.256) (0.255)
N 349,666 349,666 349,666
R2 0.50 0.50 0.50
Medium Region 0.286 - 0.352
(0.404) (0.410)
Firm - −0.213 −0.235
(0.248) (0.250)
N 521,288 521,288 521,288
R2 0.59 0.59 0.59
High Region 0.373∗∗ -0 .310∗
(0.175) (0.160)
Firm - 0.205∗ 0.186∗
(0.105) (0.103)
N 360,021 360,021 360,021
R2 0.42 0.42 0.42
Note: ∗ p<0.10; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01
Standard errors are robust and clustered on ﬁrm level.
All models include time dummies and controls for
technological state, organizational change and the
coverage by centrally bargained wages on the ﬁrm level,
as well as age, age-squared, gender and ﬁrm size
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